CONTENTS

1. Introduction: Criminal Law's Three Conduct Requirements 1

Part I. Basic Acts and the Act Requirement

2. The Doctrinal Unity of the Act Requirement 17
   1. Does Criminal Law Have an Act Requirement? 17
   2. Does Criminal Law Have One, Several, or Many Act Requirements? 38

3. The Orthodox View of the Act Requirement and Its Normative Defence 44
   1. A Preliminary Overview of the Act Requirement 44
   2. A Normative Defence of the Act Requirement 46

4. The Metaphysics of Basic Acts I: The Existence of Actions 60
   1. Do Purported Descriptions of Action Not Refer? 61
   2. The Supposedly Shadowy Existence of Events 65
   3. Human Actions as a Natural Kind of Events 73

5. The Metaphysics of Basic Acts II: The Identity of Actions with Bodily Movements 78
   1. The Identity Thesis: At Least Some Acts (the Basic Ones) Are Identical to Bodily Movements 78
   2. The Exclusivity Thesis: All Acts Are Identical to Bodily Movements 109

6. The Metaphysics of Basic Acts III: Volitions as the Essential Source of Actions 113

1. Clarifying the Mental-Cause Thesis 113
2. The Argument for Volitions 133
3. The Arguments against Volitions 155

Part II. Complex Action Descriptions and the *Actus Reus* Requirement

7. The Doctrinal Basis of the *Actus Reus* Requirement 169

1. The Problem of Borders 171
2. Interpretivist Scepticism 183

8. Unity in Complex Action Description and in the *Actus Reus* Requirement 189

1. Describing Actions 192
2. The Structure of Complex Descriptions of Action 195
3. Are All Complex Descriptions of Actions Used in the Criminal Law at least Causally Complex? 213
4. Are All Causally Complex Descriptions of Actions Equivalent to Descriptions of Basic Acts Causing Further States of Affairs? 225

9. The Normative Basis for the *Actus Reus* Requirement 239

10. The Metaphysics of Complex Actions I: The Dependence of Complex Actions on Basic Acts 245

1. Non-willed ('Involuntary') Movements as Complex Actions? 248
2. Willings without Bodily Movements as Complex Actions? 262
3. Non-willed Non-Bodily Movements as Complex Actions? 278

11. The Metaphysics of Complex Actions II: The Identity of Complex Actions with Basic Acts 280

1. The Metaphysical Issue of Identifying Every Complex Act-Token with Some Basic Act-Token 280
2. The Legal Locatability of Actions 293

Part III. The Identity Conditions of Actions and the Double Jeopardy Requirement

12. The Doctrinal and Normative Basis of the Double Jeopardy Requirement 305

1. The Double Jeopardy Doctrines and their Rationale 306
2. An Introduction to the Doctrinal, Normative, and Metaphysical Scepticisms about Double Jeopardy 317

13. Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Notions of the 'Sameness' of Action-Types 325

1. Three Approaches to Act-Type Individuation 325
2. Adjudicating between the Three Approaches to Serve the Purposes of Double Jeopardy 350

14. Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Notions of the 'Sameness' of Act-Tokens 356

1. Agent-Relative and Victim-Relative Individuation of Morally Wrongful Act-Types 356
2. The Metaphysics of Act-Token Individuation 365
3. Restricting the Metaphysical Enquiry so as to Serve the Purposes of Double Jeopardy 383

References 391

Index 405